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ABSTRACT

The Allied defeat at Arnhem, Holland in September 1944
marked the end of one of the most bold and audacious, ground
and airborne operations ever undertaken.

Many military

historian have incorrectly labeled Operation MARKET-GARDEN
an intelligence failure. This statement is true only in so
far as the Allied intelligence structure failed to persuade
their commanders to alter the planned invasion despite the
voluminous intelligence data acquired. But did these
commander have hidden agendas which made intelligence almost
irrelevant?
The purpose of this research is to investigate the
Allied, strategic and operational intelligence preparation
for Operation MARKET-GARDEN and determine its adequacy.

It

also examines the political and military factors that caused
the commanders failure to heed the intelligence warnings.
The primary focus will be upon the British 1st Airborne
Division and the battle for the Dutch town of Arnhem, however
to properly examine operational situation one can not ignore
the remainder of the First Allied Airborne Army and the
ground forces of British XXX Corps.
Although there are numerous studies of MARKET-GARDEN,
few have focused on the intelligence situation leading to the
battle. This study examines political and personal influences
in the military command process and it has as important
implications today as it did over fifty years ago.
By September 1944, the Allies great march across Western
Europe began to stall.

With their logistical system

tremendously overtaxed, the field armies struggled to

continue offensive operations.

The other great problem was a

disagreement within the Supreme Command on how best to
exploit their successes, and the apparent collapse of the
German Western Group of Forces.

The fundamental argument was

between Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery, Eisenhower
favoring a "Broad Front", while Montgomery was opting for a
narrow flanking movement which would allow the Allies to
roll-up the northern German forces and strike into the
industrial Ruhr valley.

It was out of this dynamic situation

that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was born.
Hastily planned, Operation MARKET-GARDEN was to combine
airborne (MARKET) and ground (GARDEN) assaults on Germanoccupied Holland.

The plan called for the 1st Allied

Airborne Army to seize bridges over major Dutch waterways up
to Arnhem, after which XXX Corps would pass over these
bridges and strike north.

The operation was a failure

because commanders at operational levels failed to heed the
multitude of intelligence warnings indicating that the 2nd SS
Panzer Corps had relocated to the vicinity of Arnhem.
The failure to properly direct the intelligence
collection, analysis and dissemination can directly be
attributed to the overwhelming desire to execute this
operation, despite the apparent risks, held by British
Generals Montgomery and Browning.

Montgomery rightly

believed that this was the last opportunity to attempt a
"narrow front" approach to operations in the west. Driven by
his belief in the narrow front strategy and a desire for
personal and professional fame, Montgomery overtly ignored
intelligence and allowed a hastily and inadequately planned

operation to be executed, which resulted in the destruction
of the British 1st Airborne Division.
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction and Bibliographic Review

In the early morning hours of 26 September 1944, during
a torrential downpour with temperatures dipping near 30
degrees, the tattered remnants of the British 1st Airborne
Division, 1,892 in all, withdrew from the vicinity of
Oosterbeek, Holland after sustaining 7,077 casualties.

The

forces, with the aid of a gallant Canadian engineer company,
operating in small boats, crossed the rain swollen Lower
Rhine river to the southern bank and the village of Oriel-thus ending what is arguably the most audacious combined
airborne and ground forces operation of the Second World War,
MARKET-GARDEN.
MARKET-GARDEN, an operation conceived on 10 September
and executed just seven days later, involved the combined
forces of four nations totaling near one million men.

The

goals and aspirations of MARKET-GARDEN seemed noble enough-to secure a crossing site on the Lower Rhine River, turn the
Northern flank of the German Army, bypassing the prepared
defenses of the west wall, occupying the heart of Germany's
military and industrial might, the Ruhr, then proceed across
the open Paderborn plains to Berlin ending the war in 1944-and on the surf ace may have appeared to have warranted the
use of the only theater level reserve, the First Allied
Airborne Army.

But were these goals realistic even in the

euphoric environment of early September 1944? Or were other
factors involved, personal and professional aspirations,
which fostered a command climate in which an unsound plan was
1

pushed forward at all levels by a chain of command seeking to
satisfy agendas that were less than noble?
The distinguished British military historian John
Keegan, in his widely accepted classic study of warfare, The

Face of Battle, identifies the usefulness and deficiencies in
the study of military history. 1

Furthering the stance of

Count Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, Chief of the Imperial
German Staff, Keegan discusses what Moltke called "General
Staff" history, which can also be referred to as official
history.

In this type of history, the military historian

tells the story of a battle in livid detail which is rich in
imagery and tradition.

It is true there is a time and a

place for such accounts, especially if the intent of the work
is merely to transmit the sights, sounds and feel of the
battle. However, as Keegan points out, it is the duty of the
historian to "propagate understanding of, not merely
knowledge about, the past" and taking a definitive stand is a
necessary precondition to doing this. 2

Keegan argues that

the anecdotal historian avoids this responsibility,
preferring to entertain by leaving out all that does not
serve this purpose. The anthologist historian avoids it
absolutely, pointing to a preference to allow the reader to
make up their own mind.

While the "General Staff" historian,

"also avoids the responsibility, for his mind is made up for
him by prevailing staff doctrine about the proper conduct of
war and he will accordingly select whatever facts endorse
that view, while manhandling those which offer resistance." 3
, John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 13-77.
Ibid., p. 34.

2
3

Ibid.

2

This work in military history was undertaken with
Keegan's philosophies firmly in the forefront, seeking to
clearly take a stand and at the same time attempting to shed
the biases of one that considers himself to be a "General
Staff" historian and tempered by eight years of training,
experience and indoctrination as an intelligence officer with
the United States Army.
Before continuing further, it is critical to have a
comm.on understanding of terms.

For simplicity sake, to

prevent possible confusion, the terms used throughout this
work are largely those of the modern American military, with
a sprinkling of "civilianized" and World War Two era
terminology.
The best starting point is to address the three levels
of war.

The levels of war today are much the same as in

1944, the division of military operations to assist the
commander in understanding the areas of responsibilities,
providing a visualization to the flow of the battle and
assist in allocating resources to those areas.

The levels

are divided based upon their desired outcome and not
prescribed to any certain unit size or level of comm.and.
However, generalization will be made here for the purpose of
clarity and applied to the military setting that existed in
1944 Europe.
At the strategic level of war a "nation or group of
nations use national interests to determine their strategy to
ensure an effective, response • • • [by) employing armed
forces with the other instruments of national power to secure
3

strategic goals."' The strategic situation in Europe 1944 saw
the Supreme Headquarter Allied Forces Europe (SHAEF), a
coalition command formed from the Allied waring powers,
attempting to carry out the political leaders' intent of
destroying the German military, occupation of that country
and the removal of the Adolf Hitler from power.
In the operational level of war, joint and combined
operational forces within a theater of operations performs
subordinate campaigns while conducting and sustaining major
operations and plans to accomplish the strategic objectives. 5
Again, for the purposes of this study operational forces
shall be the Army Groups, Armies, and their subordinate Corps
which were the instrument to execute SHAEF directives.
Finally, the tactical level of war is the most basic
form of operations, including such actions as battles and
engagements. These victories, put together, achieve
operational level results. 6

Division operations and lower,

for this study, shall be considered tactical operations.

One

reason that understanding the levels of war are vitally
important is that the actions (or lack of) of higher level
commanders have a great, and as shall be proven in this
study, sometimes a tragic impact upon the subordinate levels.
One other term that needs to be addressed, intelligence,
seems simple though it is often misunderstood.
MacLachlan defines intelligence as
information about the enemy.

n •

••

Donald

quite simply,

Not just any old information,

any scrap of gossip, or rumor, but relevant information which
U.S., Department of the Army, Field Manual 101·5 Ooerations. (Washington, D. C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1994). p. 6.2.
5 Ibid., p. 6.3.
8 Ibid., p. 6.4
4

4

has been processed and made as accurate as it can be • . • " 1
Intelligence is often confused with combat information, which
is raw data that has not been analyzed and its value has yet
to be determined.

Michael Handel rightly points out that in

order for the collection and analysis of intelligence to
support military operations, "these [intelligence] experts
must, in turn, be kept well informed of all the latest
developments concerning their own forces' operations and
plans. " 8 As this study shall show, the separation between
operational plans and strategic level intelligence collection
in 1944 was suspect.
This work is a study of the intelligence preparation for
Operation MARKET-GARDEN, the airborne and ground invasion of
Holland, September, 1944.

More specifically it is a study of

intelligence preparation for one battle, the attack leading
to the seizure of the road bridge in Arnhem, and the combat
commanders' influence upon the collection, analysis and
dissemination process, and how that process can be
manipulated resulting in tragic consequences at the tactical
level.

Further it is the thesis of this work to disprove the

assertion of historians that claim the preparation for
operation MARKET-GARDEN was an intelligence failure and in
fact show that the reasons this operation failed can be
traced to combat commanders at strategic, operational and
tactical levels.

Donald Maclachlan, "Intelligence: The Common Denominator,· in The Fourth Dimension of
warfare, Vol. I: Intelligence. Subversion. Resistance,ec:I. Michael Eliot-Bateman (New York:
Penguin Publishing, 1970). pp. 53·54.
8 Michael Handel, "Intelligence and Military Operations," in Intelligence and Military Operations,
ed. Michael Handel (London: Frank Cass Publishing, 1990), p. 1.

1

5

To support the assertion that MARKET-GARDEN was not an
intelligence failure, evidence shall be presented focusing on
Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery, Commander of the 21st
Army Group, and his role in the operational planning for
MARKET-GARDEN.

Pointing to a breakdown in unified strategy

between the strategic level (Eisenhower and SHAEF) and the
operational level (Montgomery and 21st Army Group), and
fueled by the "narrow" versus "broad" front approaches, it
shall be proven that comm.and influences had much more to do
with the failure of MARKET-GARDEN than did poor intelligence
preparation. Driven by desires for personal glory and
prestige as well as suffering the effects of the euphoric
"victory happy" atmosphere of early September 1944,
Montgomery devised a tactically unsound plan and created a
command climate in which this plan was nurtured and accepted
with few criticisms.
The foundation of research for this work shall be upon
the intelligence preparation for MARKET-GARDEN, as the main
objective is to disprove the intelligence failure theory.
This will be accomplished by examining primary and secondary
sources that will demonstrate the vast amount of intelligence
available to Montgomery.

When presenting primary information

such as intelligence summaries, operations instructions and
combat information reports, complete sectional extracts shall
included.

When studying intelligence source it is vital to

capture not only the pertinent words, but also the context
and flavor of the analysis.

Secondly, the work shall focus

upon the comm.and relationship between Eisenhower and
Montgomery and an examination of the command climate in order
6

to understand why MARKET-GARDEN was planned accordingly.
Lastly, the focus will be on the plan for the British 1st
Airborne Division and its tactical execution, thereby probing
the effects that strategic and operational levels of war can
have upon the tactical level.
In the fifty-two years since operation MARKET-GARDEN
there have been numerous studies produced. Most of these fall
into one of about three categories; general biographies of
Montgomery or other key players that devote one chapter or
less to the operation; general histories of the battle, many
by former participants which trace events chronologically;
and those that concentrate on the military arts which tend to
focus upon general engagements and the role of various
military specialities associated with the operation. Even
during the 1994 publishing boom, to coincide with the
fiftieth anniversary of the battle, most works could be
classified in the above categories with perhaps one notable
exception.

In 1990, Robert Kershaw, a serving officer with

the Parachute Regiment, published an extraordinarily detailed
account of German tactical operations in and around Arnhem
1944. 9

This meticulously researched work draws upon German

wartime archives and personal interviews and is truly second
to none.

Kershaw's book avoids the Allied debates preceding

the operation, instead providing the most detailed record of
the opposing forces available.

The British counterpart to

Kershaw's book is Martin Middlebrook's equally superb work
published in 1994. 10 Middlebrook, relying more heavily upon
9

10

Robert Kershaw, It Never Snows in September (New York: Hippocrene Books Inc., 1990).
Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944 (San Fransico: Westview, 1994).

7

personal interviews, captures every aspect of the battle from
the numerous regiments which fought there.

Due to the nature

of the research method employed and its reliance on personal
accounts of the battle, this work of scholarship shall stand
as the foremost reference for examining the tactical
situation at Arnhem.
When reviewing the available literature on the battle of
Arnhem, extreme caution should be used.

Many of the widely

read secondary sources were written using primarily other
secondary sources a their mainstay.

Because of this many of

the commonly accepted myths about the battle are widely
propagated and based little on fact.

The second major

consideration when examining the intelligence preparation and
command decision process, is the declassification and release
of ULTRA11 intercepts starting in early 1978.

Any publication

that does not consult this veritable gold-mine of primary
source material should be severely scrutinized.
Ronald Lewin is perhaps one of the best examples of a
historian utilizing the post 1978 sources to alter his
opinions.

In his 1971 biography entitled Montgomery As

Military Commander, Lewin is quick to deflect the blame for
the MARKET-GARDEN failure from Montgomery:
Eisenhower is as much at fault as Montgomery, for
he promised a logistical support which didn't quite
materialize and an effort by the American First
Army on Montgomery's right flank, an effort which
failing, meant that Montgomery had to use his
precious transport to move up his VIII Corps to
fill the gap. • • Arnhem was essentially a tactical
ULTRA is the code name used for the Allied interception and decryption of German military high
level wireless communication network. More on this subject shall be covered in chapter five.
11

8

failure - once the doubtful commitment had been
undertaken - and for a multitude of reasons for
which Montgomery was not responsible. 12

Lewin furthers an often used argument that finds little
historical support, the lack of logistical support by SHAEF.
The motivation for this approach seems to be more from a
continuation of the Anglo-American military rivalry than
fact. 13
With the release of ULTRA and his study ULTRA Goes to

War, Lewin softens his support for Montgomery in light of the
voluminous amounts of intelligence he received prior to the
execution of MARKET-GARDEN.
Here are the elements - arrogance, impatience for
action and refusal to adjust a hastily frozen plan
- that made MARKET-GARDEN a disaster even before
Sunday 17 September • • • Many technical errors were
committed before and after the 17th.
• but no
error was so grave as the failure to identify the
presence of a Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area.,.

Although quite right in his revised assessment, Lewin

12

Ronald Lewin, MontaomeryAsMilitaryCommander (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), pp. 237-

238.

Several detailed studies of logistic operations in World War Two ETO have revealed that the
amount of supplies sent to General Patton's army prior to and during MARKET-GARDEN were a
mere 500 tons more per day than would be used if they halted and were in defensive operations
(a division required 650 tons per day to advance). Historian 8. Liddell-Hart points to the internal
supply and logistic failures of the 21st Army Group such as. 1400 trucks down for maintenance
causing only 800 per day to be delivered; the dedication of transport aircraft to the aborted
Toumai airborne operation resulting in a six day fuel shortage of 1.5 million gallons; decision to
resupply forward Corps with ammunition as opposed to fuel despite impending large scale
offensive operations. Communication Zone estimates reveal 13,000 tons per day being
delivered to the two army groups during September 1944. B. H. Liddell-Hart, History of Second
World War (London: Cassell, 1970) pp. 589-590. Ronald Ruppenthal, gen ed., United States
Army in Wortd War II The European Theater of Operations. 2 vols. (Washington D. C.: Center of
Military History United States Army, 1987), vol 2: Logistical Supoort of the Armies Seotember
1944·May 1945, by Ronald Ruppenthal.
14 Ronald Lewin, ULTRA Goes to War (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978) p. 347.
13

9

improperly labels MARKET-GARDEN as an intelligence failure. 15
Reasons such as complacency and the fact that "nobody wanted
to know" are more evidence supporting a command failure
rather than an intelligence failure. 15 Lewin discredits his
revision further by stating that the failure to disseminate
intelligence on the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was a "pardonable
error" on the part of Montgomery.

As

this study will show,

it would possibly be a pardonable error for a novice
commander that was inexperienced in the use of high level
intelligence, however Montgomery was not such, having relied
heavily upon intelligence in Africa and preparation for the
Normandy invasion.
Examining additional literature currently available, one
can find as many theories for the failure of the operation as
there are sources. One commonality among most works is the
heavy emphasis upon the highly tangible tactical failures,
which are often given as the reason for failure of the whole
operation.

Other Montgomery biographers have reached a wide

range of conclusions including the Australian Chester
Wilmont.

This war correspondent argues that the failure of

MARKET-GARDEN was the "result of tactical failures • • • this
does not mean that the plan was overly ambitious or that the
objectives were inevitably beyond his [Montgomery] reach. 1111
R.

w.

Thompson in Montgomery The Field Marshal points to

Nijmegan and the area on the "island" as the cause of XXX

Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 347-349.
17 Chester Wilmont, The Struggle for Eurooe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 524
15

18

10

Corps inability to reach the besieged paratroops at Arnhem. 16
"The plain fact is that the 1st Airborne division had been
parachuted out upon a hopeless and impossible limb in
accordance with a vain and irresponsibly optimistic plan,
inadequately thought out. 19
Major General H. Essame, who at the time of the battle
commanded a brigade in the 43rd Wessex Division where he also
served as historian, records the following endorsement of
Montgomery:
That at the decisive moment the Corps commander
lacked adequate forces was no fault of his the Army
commander's or the Field Marshal's
had the
entire effort been placed in the hands of the Field
Marshal he might have ended the campaign in the
autumn of 1944 • . . he himself thought so and he is
not given to rash statements. 20

These conclusions raise more questions than they actually
answer.

If the plan lacked adequate manpower resources at

the critical place and time, whose fault was it?

Eisenhower,

committed the First Allied Airborne Army to 21st Army Group
and from there the operational planners should be held
accountable for the shortage in resources to support the
plan.

Besides, one issue that shall be addressed later, is

the fact that the avenue of approach towards Arnhem could not
support the vehicles of XXX Corps and additional resources
could not have realistically made an impact on the rate of
advance.

This is further supported by Alun Chalfont who

R. W. Thompson, Montgomery The Field Marshal (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1969),
pp. 198-200.
19 lbid.
20 H. Essame, The 43rd Wessex Division at War. 1944-45 (London: William Clowes, 1952 ), p.
132.
18

11

states, "Arnhem showed a serious error of judgment • • • and
was a direct reflection of Montgomery's tactical thinking. 21
One Montgomery biographer believes that Arnhem is "an
incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by
particular circumstance and the poignant tragedy of the
stranded paratroops. " 22 On the surf ace this may appear
blasphemous to Arnhem historians, however if one accepts the
Keegan theory that any penetration of the Rhine and the
German Ruhr would have been quickly extinguished by the
forming 6th Panzer Army preparing for the now infamous Battle
of the Bulge, the statement is at least arguably plausible.
The Keegan theory has much merit when the logistical
situation in September 1944 is also considered.

The Allies

were unable to sustain prolonged offensive operations
regardless of the "narrow" versus "broad" front strategies. 23
The final two works that bear mentioning, are general
works on MARKET-GARDEN.

First, what is now heralded as a

classic piece of journalistic history, A Bridge Too Far, that
is flavored with great human interest storylines and accented
with highly sensationalized accounts.

For scholarly research

it provides one of the better descriptions of Dutch
underground and human intelligence operations. 24

In 1984,

Geoffrey Powell, a company commander during the battle,
published a well researched account of the battle that is
based extensively on primary sources and first hand

Alun Chalfont, Montgomery of Alamein (New York: Atheneum, 1976), pp. 252-253.
Alan Moorehead, Montgomery (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1946), p. 247.
23 Ruppenthal, Logistical vol. 2, pp. 11-19.
24 Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far (New York: Simon and Schuster: 1974).
21

22

12

experiences. 25

Accessing many unpublished documents, Powell

has compiled the best single volume bibliography on MARKETGARDEN. Although relying on much of the same research
materials, this work and that of Powell conflict on its
interpretation and thus the conclusion drawn from it.
As these works are perhaps the best examples of the
scholarship on the battle for Arnhem, there has yet to be a
study that focuses exclusively upon the intelligence
preparation prior to the battle. As previously mentioned most
works only refer to intelligence as one small part of the
overall battle or part of detailed studies of intelligence
operations during the Second World War.
As is evidenced by this literature review there is a
need for this type of study, if not to right a historical
wrong, then to produce a concise study of the intelligence
preparation prior to Arnhem.

However, more importantly, a

study such as this can have a great impact upon the training
of young military officers.

It is through the study of

military history that those in the profession of arms are
taught to repeat the successes of previous generations, but
more importantly to learn from their mistakes so as not to
repeat their failures.

Hindsight is truly twenty-twenty and

the intent of this work is not to "what if" a battle that
occurred over fifty years ago, but to examine the information
available to connnanders at the time, learn from their
mistakes and avoid such a tragic and needless sacrifice of
life in the future.
25

Geoffrey Powell, The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem 1944 (New York: Buchan and

Enright Publishers, 1984).
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CHAPTER TWO:
Evolution

Strategic Overview

of the ff'estern European !l'heater of Operation

In order to fully understand the context and environment
in which operation MARKET-GARDEN grew, one must review the
strategic setting in western Europe from June - September
1944.

The operation code named OVERLORD, the long awaited
invasion of France, like most military operations did not go
completely as envisioned by the planners or the Supreme
Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Over 650,000

soldiers of the American, British and Canadian forces landed
upon the beaches of Normandy on the Western coast of France,
with the mission of breaching German defenses and firmly
establishing a substantial beachhead from which to launch
future operations.

The planners had called for the securing

of Caen by D+lO, after nearly seven weeks of the fighting the
Allied advance had created a penetration only twenty-five
miles deep, along an eighty mile front, with Caen still
secure in German hands.

By 18 July 1944, despite suffering

in excess of 122,000 casualties, the Allies were preparing
for offensive operations that they hoped would break the
German lines, move them beyond the hedgerow country and allow
for large scale mobile warfare.
The Allied breakout at the end of July came with
lightning speed on the American front.

Field Marshal

Montgomery, Commander of the recently reorganized 21st Army
Group and operational commander for all ground forces,
unleashed Operation COBRA on 25 July, the flanking attack by
the newly formed

u. s.

12th Army Group,
14

General Omar Bradley

commanding.

Despite the American successes, the deliberate

and methodical Montgomery delayed the offensive operations of
the British and Canadian forces, while seeking additional
resources and time.

General Eisenhower pressed Montgomery,

"never was time more vital to us, and we should not wait on
weather or on perfection of detail of preparation. " 26

In the

same spirit of urgency, General Montgomery ordered General
Dempsey, commander of the Second British Army, to throw all
caution overboard, to take risks, "to accept any casualties
and to step on the gas for Vire." 21

Field Marshall von Kluge,

who had replaced the ousted Field Marshall von Rundstedt as
commander of German Army Group B, committed his final
reserves to stopping the Allies.

On the 31st the American

spearhead burst through the front at Avranches.

Pouring

through the gap, Patton's tanks quickly raced across the open
country beyond.

German attempts at stemming the changing

tide were hopeless. The Fifth Panzer Army and remnants of the
Seventh Army was trapped in a cauldron to be known as the
"Falaise Pocket".

This defeat was devastating for the German

forces, not only in terms of morale but in the shear loss of
men and equipment. Over fifty thousand prisoners were taken
with 10,000 more soldiers lying dead upon the field. 28
Despite the enormous success of the Falaise campaign, many

Kent R. Greenfield, gen. ed. United States Armv in World war II (Washington, DC: GPO., 1954),
The Eurooean Theater of Ooerations: The Supreme Command, by Forrest C. Pogue., p. 201.
27 Ibid.
28 Various sources have conflicting reports on the exact numbers killed, prisoners and escaped
from the Falaise pocket, this author has elected to use the official U. S. Army History of World War
Two. Kent A. Greenfield, gen. ed. United States Army in World war II (Washington, DC:
GPO., 1954), The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit, by Martin Blumenson.,
26

pp. 257-8.
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tattered fragments of German units escaped westward, less
their equipment, from the Allies trap.

After the battle,

accusations and attempts to fix blame for the escaping enemy
were rampant among both British and American commanders.
These feelings of distrust and the drive to claim personal
credit for allied successes would haunt the theater in the
months to come.
Following the hard-fought campaign in Normandy, the
Allies fielded forty combat divisions and forged northeastwards through France and Belgium.

On 25 August 1944,

Paris was liberated after four years of German occupation.
Patton's Army was sweeping south and east of the French
capital heading for the German frontier, while the British
Second Army was off for Brussels which it occupied on 3
September 1944.

The next day elements of the British 11th

Armored Division, commanded by General 'Pip' Roberts, entered
and captured the port city of Antwerp saving its harbor,
sluice gates and port installations before the Germans could
destroy them.

However the glory was short lived, as Roberts'

forces were ordered to stop short of the Albert Canal.

This

permitted the German Fifteenth Army to escape to Beveland and
Walcheren Islands, by moving at night and on small crafts
they were able to reach the safety of the mainland where the
Allies would soon again have to face their dreaded foe. 29

By

Historian Alistair Horne quotes a 21st Army Group Intelligence Summary by Intelligence Officer,
Brigadier Bill Williams which stated that by 18 September, "probably over 100,000 men had
crossed into the Scheidt Peninsula since Antwerp was captured.· Horne further states that,
"Their presence at Arnhem would tilt the balance and turn what might have been a victory into
disaster, sacrificing a fine division and the lives of thousands of British, American and Polish
airborne troops.· Alistair Horne and David Montgomery, Monty The Lonely Leader. 1944-1945
(New York: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 279.
29
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controlling the estuary and the harbor approaches, the
Germans rendered the port useless, meaning that all supplies
and critical resources would still have to travel via ground
transportation over the 400 miles from the Normandy beaches.
The critical nature of the Antwerp ports can not be
overstated.

In the final days of August and early September

the Allied offensive approached overextension as the armies
pushed farther away from the few established port facilities
while advancing as many as two hundred miles per day.

The

competition for logistical support sharply restricted their
ability to continue. 30

On the same day that Roberts' forces

reached Antwerp, Montgomery ordered them to halt fearing they
were endanger of outrunning their administrative resources.
To say that this displeased General Brian Horrocks, Commander
of British XXX Corps, would be an understatement since his
vehicles were freshly fueled and unlike General Montgomery he
fully understood the importance of the port city.
To my mind 4th September was the key date in the
battle for the Rhine.

Had we been able to advance

that day we could have smashed through this screen
and advanced northward with little or nothing to
stop us.

we might even have succeeded in bouncing

a crossing over the Rhine.

But we halted. 31

General Roberts was rightfully more critical of
Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted

°FAAA Headquarters, "First Allied Airborne Army Report On Operations In Holland: SeptemberNovember 1944" (22 December 1944), p. 9.
31 Brian Horrocks, A Full Life (London: Collins Press, 1960), p. 205.
3
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much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's
failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good
General at seizing opportunities." 32

The inflexibility of

Montgomery would cost the Allies in time and personnel, the
Antwerp port which would not be operational for three months
and at the cost of 30,000 servicemen killed, missing and
wounded. Later 40,000 tons of supplies daily, enough to
support two million fighting forces, would pass through the
port. 33 In fairness to Montgomery, a large portion of the
failure to secure the Scheldt estuary should be shared with
the combat commander on the ground, Roberts.

It was his duty

to ensure that his superiors had a firm understanding of the
tactical situation in their area of operations.

Secondly,

the Supreme Commander is not void of harsh criticism for his
failure to stress the urgent importance of securing the port
for future operations and his inability to recognize this
fact until 8 October, at which time he ordered that to become
the main focus of Montgomery's forces.
By mid-September the Second British Army, comprised of
VIII, XII and XXX Corps, were formed in a line roughly that
followed that of the Meuse-Escaut Canal.

To the southeast,

u. s. Army had advanced to the German frontier and the
Siegfried Line near Aachen. Farther south, Third u. s. Army

First

had established bridgeheads over the River Moselle north of
Metz.

The losses inflicted by the advancing Allied armies on

the forces of German high command in the west were almost
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and
Enright, 1983), pp. 201-2.
33 Geoffrey Powell, The Devil's Birthday: The Bridges to Arnhem. 1944 (New York: Franklin Watts,
1984). p. 21.
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incomprehensible.

Of the forty-eight

German infantry

divisions fighting in France on June 6th, three had been
evacuated from the West altogether.

Nine were being

reconstructed in the Replacement Army.
in French ports.

Seven were besieged

Eight had been dissolved as "beyond repair"

and of the twenty-one still nominally in the order of battle,
eight were classified as remnants. Twenty-seven infantry
divisions that once were the backbone of the western defenses
had simply disappeared after the fighting in France.

The

Panzer divisions suffered the same fate with eleven of twelve
reduced to the size of armor companieS. 34
The German Army in the west had been broken and after
sustaining 500,000 casualties (with 250,000 dead), it was in
a headlong and disorderly retreat back to "the Fatherland".
The culmination of this withdrawal from the battlefield in
Holland occurred on 5 September and is known in Dutch history
as Dolle Dinsdag

(Mad Tuesday).

Allied commanders and

planners at all levels seemed to be greatly affected by the
victory virus. The Joint Intelligence Committee published a
staff estimate in which they predicted that the German
capacity to resist was extremely minimal and that the war
could feasibly be ended by December 1944. 35

This estimate

was sharply criticized by Winston Churchill, who during this
time seemly was one of very few who resisted the euphoria
that spread on the continent:

John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy From 0-0ay to the Liberation of Paris (New York:
Penguin Books, 1983), p. 315.
35 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), Joint Intelligence Committee.
Subject: "JIC SHAEF (44) 11 : German Intention In The West." 21 August 1944.
34
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"I have now read this report, and have not noticed
any facts in it of which I was not already aware.
Generally speaking, I consider it errs on the side
of optimism.
It is at least as likely that Hitler
will be fighting on January 1 as that he will
collapse before then.
If he does • • • it will be
from
purely
political
reason
rather
than
military. ''36

It was within this victorious atmosphere that operation
MARKET-GARDEN was conceived.

Broad Front

-vs- Narrow Front Strategy

The month preceding the Allied invasion of France,
although littered with occasional disagreements related to
operational concerns, represented the peak of Allied
cooperation and unity.

Coming off of successful campaigns in

Africa and the Mediterranean, the Allies now focused on the
conjointly accepted plan that would lead to the defeat of
Germany.

The planners had envisioned, after the breakout of

Normandy, a mutually supporting two pronged attack led by the
21st and 12th Army Groups.

The intermediate objective,

leading to the main objective of Berlin, was the Ruhr
industrial region.

When captured this would reduce German

industrial production and thus their ability to wage war,
possibly securing an unconditional surrender without further
fighting.

This would be accomplished by advancing the 21st

Army Group along a line roughly from Amiens-Liege-Aachen,
passing north of the Ardennes forest.

The 12th Army Group

Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1953), vol. VI: Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 170-1.
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would travel a course from Troyes-Nancy-Metz, south of the
Ardennes capturing the Saar industrial region en route to
Frankfurt then joining the forces from the north to encircle
the majority of German forces in the west. 37 During times of
optimum Allied cooperation the plan seemed feasible.
However, soon the Americans and British found themselves
engaged in two hard fought struggles, one against the Germans
and the second between themselves.
While the Allies were making great strides and achieving
enormous successes on the battlefield, the situation within
Allied command structure was strained almost to the breaking
point.

The original invasion plan for France called for

Allied forces to reach the Seine by D+90, which they
accomplished this nine days ahead of schedule, and to be at
the Siegfried Line at D+350.

Another dimension of the plan

called for General Eisenhower to assume command of the
theater as soon as the operational battle of Normandy was
complete.
As early as 2 July, prior to the Normandy breakout,
Montgomery began advocating a revision of the grand strategy.
Now calling for forces of British, American and Canadian
armies, under his operational control, to concentrate their
combat power and attempt a thrust to Pas de Calais.

This was

the beginning of several 'single thrust' proposals by
Montgomery and strongly advocated by his supporters in the
War Office, namely Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field
Marshal Alan Brooke.

37

Montgomery's proposals all had a common

Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 657·64.
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theme; they called for the numerically superior

u. s.

forces

to serve in a supporting role under his leadership, just as
in Tunisia and attempted in Sicily.

Over the course of two

months this would become Montgomery's obsession.

Driven by

his own ego, any plan put forth by another that did not
conform to his own, was labeled tactically unsound or
logistically impossible, leaving only his as the only true
way to end the war in 1944.
On 17 August 1944, with Montgomery having apparently
little knowledge as to when he would be relegated to
commanding the British and Canadian armies, he met with
Bradley to discuss his future strategy.

It was out of this

meeting that came Montgomery's second single thrust strategy,
that is as feverishly debated today by military professionals
and historians as it was in 1944.
point plan.

Montgomery proposed a six

" After crossing the Seine, 12 and 21 Army

Groups should keep together as a solid mass of some forty
divisions which would be so strong that it need fear
nothing. " 38

Twenty First Army Group would move along and

clear the coast, while 12th Army Group would form the eastern
flank and move north of the Ardennes towards Aachen.

This

movement would pivot on Paris while the Seventh Army moved
from Southern France toward the Saar.

The basic objective of

what essentially is the Schlieffen Plan of 1914 reversed, was
to "secure bridgeheads over the Rhine before the winter began
and to seize the Ruhr quickly. " 39

Montgomery claims that

Bernard L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.
K. G. (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 239.
39 Ibid.
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Bradley was in full agreement with his proposal and the only
task remaining was to secure the approval of Eisenhower.
Bradley was not in full agreement for he was convinced
of the need to secure the port of Antwerp and to eliminate
launch sites for the V-1 rockets, which were inflicting great
civilian casualties, in London. He was willing to support the
British northerly attack with an adequate level of American
forces to cover the right flank (one corps from Hodges' First
Army). 40 On August 18th, while receiving Eisenhower at his
headquarters, Bradley outlined some of his reservations for
his British counter-part's plan to end the war:
There were any number of weaknesses in the plan.
The principle one was that Monty would be in
complete charge.
We would be putting all our money
on a horse that looked good in the paddock but had
a tough time getting out of the starting gate and
had never shown well on a fast track.
we had well
noted Monty's ponderous build-ups and long delays
before mounting an attack, his apparent reluctance
to take risks and pursue and exploit (at El
Alamein, the Marth Line, Chott Line, Sicily, Italy,
Caen on D-Day, Falaise Gap).
Now he is asking us
to believe that he could lead us straight through
to Berlin in a single quick dash that would be one
of the riskiest maneuvers in the history of
warfare.
41

The fears expressed by Bradley were in fact valid
concerns. Few in the American and even the British armies
believed that Montgomery was a commander particularly gifted
with the mental flexibility and tenacity required of great

Omar Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life An Autobiography by General of the Army Omar
N. Bradley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 313.
41
lbid.,p.311.
40

23

offensive generals.

According to Michael Carver, Montgomery

made "caution and calculations the bedrock of his military
art. " 42

In addition to questions of leadership and tactical

thinking during offensive operations, there was the
consideration of terrain.

The terrain along the northern

route is far less suitable for the employment of armor, as
the countryside is riddled with streams, marshlands, canals
and rivers, restricting mechanized forces to constricted and
highly vulnerable roads.
Shortly after the meeting, Eisenhower while at Bradley's
headquarters, received a communication from U.

s.

Chief of

Staff, General George C. Marshall stating: "the Secretary
[Secretary of War, Henry Stimson] and I and apparently all
Americans are strongly of the opinion that time has come for
you to assume direct exercise of command of the American
contingent. " 43

Marshall went on to congratulate Eisenhower

and Bradley for their great victory in the Normandy campaign
but no such compliments were forthcoming for Montgomery.
On 21 August at a planning strategy meeting, that
Montgomery chose not to attend, Eisenhower announced that he
would take personal command on 1 September 1944.

One might

wonder why Montgomery could be so noticeably absent from a
meeting of such magnitude, given his obsession with the
future course of the Allies in Europe.

His Chief of Staff,

Francis de Guingand explained that Montgomery disliked facing
what he called, "the inefficient staff officers at SHAEF that
Michael Carver·, "Montgomery" in Churchill's Generals ed. John Keegan (New York: Grove
Weidenfeld, 1991), p. 149.
43
Stephen Ambrose, The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwiaht D.
Eisenhower (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1970), p. 498.
42
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he believed were disloyal to him and also despite all of his
self-confidence he hated to be asked questions directly." 44
After sending de Guingand, unsuccessfully, to convince
Eisenhower to alter his decision, Montgomery proposed a
meeting at his TAC Headquarters on the 23rd of August.
During this meeting Montgomery again laid out the merits of a
single unified thrust, outlining the need to concentrate
logistic and maintenance resources and pointing to the fact
that administratively they were too weak for the broad front
to be successful.

Montgomery prophetically stated, "if he

[Eisenhower) adopted the broad front strategy, with the whole
line advancing and everyone fighting all the time, the
advance would inevitably peter out, the Germans would be
given time to recover, and the war would go on all through
the winter and well into 1945. " 45

Montgomery went on to lobby

for his retention as ground forces commander by saying, "a
Supreme commander should sit on a very lofty perch and not
descend into the land battle and become a ground C in C." 46
Seeing that he was unable to win his case, Montgomery
halfheartedly offered to serve under Bradley, a proposal
which he knew that Eisenhower was in no position to accept.
Apparently aware that his warnings were going unheeded,
Montgomery set off on yet another strategic debate by
demanding an American Army of twelve divisions to advance
under his control on his right flank.

He fully understood

that his demands would reduce Patton's army to just 6
44

Francis de Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979), pp. 16-

17.
45
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Montgomery, Memoirs, p. 241.
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divisions and relegate it scarcely capable of defensive
operations.

Eisenhower, in his memoirs, diplomatically

explains Montgomery's self-centeredness by stating that, "he
lacked an understanding of the situation on other fronts." 47
The Supreme Commander patiently listened to the proposal of
his subordinate before agreeing that, as it has always been,
the Ruhr was the immediate focus of all offensive operations.
He ordered Bradley to commit Hodges' First Army north of the
Ardennes to support the 21st Army Groups' right flank.
Further he committed logistic support to the operation by
directly allocating tonnage to support not only the British
and Canadians but Hodges' forces as well.

Patton's Third

Army had been reduced to a supporting role. 48
With the northerly advance making great gains of 250
miles in just six days, it was evident that the German line
had cracked before the Third Army as well as in the north. On
4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX
Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy
miles from the Rhine river.

In a military blunder second

only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time
to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously
existed.

Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his

memoirs:
Had we been able to advance that day we could have
smashed through •
• and advanced northward with
little or nothing to stop us.
we might even have
succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine • •

47
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• • • if we had taken the chance and carried on . •
. the whole course of the war in Europe might have
changed.••

As the Allies paused to resupply, Eisenhower, having
already conceded to Montgomery's failed single thrust once,
examined various strategies to finish what most now
considered a defeated enemy.

However, no one told the

Germans that they were beaten and in an extraordinary display
of improvisation, that only the German army could do, they
formed units from remnants and established a cohesive defense
out of chaos.

Eisenhower consequently reverted to basically

the same plan drawn up in London during 1943 by the planning
staffs, which called for an advance along a broad front.
Montgomery again outraged, met with his commander in a
desperate attempt to alter his decision (the 12th Army Group
had already begun their advance and were closing on the
Siegfried Line).
As the Allied military leaders formulated their future
plans, Adolf Hitler deployed the second generation of his
"wonder weapons", the V-2 rocket.

In early September 1944,

as the V-2s showered terror upon the citizens of London,
military engineers determined from the rockets trajectory
that the launch sites were in south-western Holland.

Brooke

informed Montgomery of the information and requested
immediate operations to clear the possible launch areas.
Thus during a critical military planning juncture, political
influences from Britain applied pressure upon the commanders.
Omar Bradley describes; "The sudden appearance of the V-2s
49
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provided Monty a heaven-sent (literally and figuratively)
opportunity to mount another internal political campaign to
have his way with ground strategy. " 50
The MARKET-GARDEN strategy was Montgomery's last hope at
single-handedly capturing the Ruhr and then Berlin.

Once a

breakthrough in the south occurred, logistical support would
shift and he would never again be in a position of such
strength.

He was fully aware that if successful and his

forces were located across the Rhine, Eisenhower would be
hard pressed to not exploit the success.

Bradley saw MARKET-

GARDEN for what it was, "a desperate attempt by a man
obsessively determined to lead a single thrust to Berlin
• it was strategy by subterfuge, legerdemain. " 51

It is true

that the plan curiously approved by Eisenhower was not sound.
Instead of consolidating and linking the already overextended
forces, this plan allowed over one-third of the total combat
power to turn, change directions and create large gaps
between Hodges' and Dempsey's armies, not to mention the
massive amounts of supplies diverted from 12th Army Group
which was engaged along all fronts.
The strategic debates of August and September 1944 are
still highly contested issues today.

Most agree that the

lack of unity behind one effort and the failure to exploit
success no doubt caused setbacks in western European
operations.

However, historians are sharply divided as to

which effort should have been supported and to what degree
the Allies suffered from their periods of inactivity.
50
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Liddell-Hart, although supporting Montgomery's reasoning,
believes that the last true hope to end the war in 1944
dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August
1944. 52 While many like John Keegan, supporting the broad

front strategy, believed the Germans maintained enough combat
power in 1944 to thwart any single thrust, as they had done
on so many other fronts. 53 Logistically, the Allies were
unable to sustain offensive operations along a broad front
for a sufficient length of time to exploit their localized
successes. Combining logistic problems with the Germans
ability to counterattack isolated breakthroughs, the Allies
possessed no ability to realistically conclude the war in
1944.H

With the execution and subsequent failure of
Montgomery's narrow thrust, MARKET-GARDEN, the strategic
debate did not subside.

Montgomery began a campaign to fix

blame for the failure on SHAEF due to the mythical lack of
support provided:
If the operation had been properly backed from its
inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces,
and administrative resources necessary for the job
- it would have succeeded • • • 55

As he rallied supporters within the War Office and British
Army, Montgomery lobbied furiously to be allowed to achieve

52
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his greatness through the capture of Berlin. 56

The personal

and professional relationship between Eisenhower and
Montgomery continued to grow more antagonistic and negative,
despite the best diplomatic efforts of the Supreme Commander.
In December 1944, using the German counter-offensive now
called the Battle of the Bulge as his platform, he advocated
his restoration as commander of all ground forces.

If not

for the timely and tactful intervention of his Chief of
Staff, de Guingand, Montgomery would have been relieved of
command. Although he remained in command until the end of the
war, "the August split never completely healed. " 57

MARKET-GARDEN

The

Plan

Immediately after Montgomery's conference with
Eisenhower on 10 September, Dempsey ordered Browning to start
planning Operation MARKET.

Montgomery's formal order was

issued on 12 September, after briefing General Horrocks.

The

plan called for the First Allied Airborne Army to assist
Second Army in a rapid advance from the Meuse-Escaut Canal to
the Zuider Zee--a distance near 100 miles.
Operation MARKET, the airborne portion, would capture
bridges over the major rivers and canals at three towns
Eindhoven, about 13 miles from the start line, Nijmegan 53
One could easily content that Berlin was a more important objective to the British than to the
Americans. Occupation of the German capital would be vital for the control and stability of a postwar Germany. The British were also highly skeptical of the alliance with the Soviet Union and
prophetically feared a Soviet dominated Eastern Europe if they were to advance as far as Berlin.
Wrth the Yalta conference still six months away, both politically and militarily Berlin as an objective
was perceived to be realistic.
57 FrancisdeGuingand, GeneralsAtWar (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964), pp. 102-112.
56
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miles away, and Arnhem 64 miles away. (See Map 1, Appendix A)
Operation GARDEN would see ground forces led by British
XXX Corps, advance along a tree-lined elevated double laned
road that ran through a drained marshland.

The orchards,

small streams and ditches greatly limited cross-country
movement, the area between Nijmegan and the Lower Rhine and
were so restrictive it was referred to as the 'island'.
Supporting XXX Corps' advance would be XII Corps on the left
and VIII Corps on the right. The ground forces of XXX Corps
would lead with the Guards Armoured Division supported by the
43rd Wessex Infantry Division.
General Browning's plan called for the American 101st
Airborne Division to secure crossings over the Aa River and
Willems Canal at Veghel, the Dommel River at St. Oedenrode,
and over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son, then capture the city
of Eindhoven by nightfall on the first day.

The Americans

would deploy all three regiments, less artillery, in one
airlift.
The 82nd Airborne Division's first priority was the
capture and control of the Groesbeek heights, high ground
that dominates the surrounding area, followed by bridges over
the Maas River and Maas-Waal canal at Grave.

Once these

objectives were taken the airborne forces could attempt an
assault on the Waal River bridge in Nijmegan.
The British 1st Airborne Division would have the prize,
the road, rail and pontoon bridges over the Lower Rhine River
at Arnhem.

The British planned to drop upon the heath lands

west of the city of Oosterbeek, eight miles from their
objectives.

Two brigades, the 1st Para and 1st Airlanding,
31

would drop on the 17th, followed by the 4th Para on the 18th.
The Polish Parachute Brigade was attached and expected to
drop south of the bridge on the 19th.

Divisional forces were

hampered by General Browning's decision to deploy the Corps
headquarters on the 17th.

This would require 38 tugs and

gliders, enough to support the drop of an infantry battalion.
Once ground forces linked up with airborne forces they
would proceed north to the Zuider Zee, clearing the Deelen
airfield enroute for the arrival of the 52nd Lowlands
Division (Air Portable).

When of sufficient strength, 2nd

Army would turn right for an assault on the Ruhr. 58

58
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Signals

Intelligence Collection Methods

Intelligence Collection

(SIGIH)

ULTRA, the code name given to the collection of highlevel signals of the German armed forces, was one of the most
prized intelligence sources of the war.

The value of its

information justified its classification of "Ultra Secret"
and its associated distribution restrictions.

The effort by

the Polish, French and British cryptanalysts that developed
the ability to decrypt transmissions from the German modified
Enigma machine, were perhaps the greatest achievement and
contributions made by intelligence professionals in any war.
Ralph Bennett, a British Intelligence Corps Staff Officer,
worked for four years at Bletchle¥ Park, England, where ULTRA
was translated, analyzed and disseminated.

His assessment

of ULTRA is extremely useful:
For by of ten revealing the enemy's plans to them
before they decided their own, ULTRA gave the
Allied commanders an unprecedented advantage in
battle: since ULTRA was derived from decodes of the
Wehrmacht' s wireless communications, there could be
no doubt about its authenticity, and action based
upon
it could be taken with the greatest
confidence. •9

As German forces withdrew closer to their homeland the
use of wireless communications was reduced.

However, in

September 1944 vast amounts of intelligence was still being
provided on the status of Army Group B, as well as other
commands in the west.

Intelligence related to German

defensive preparations and troop deployments in the MARKETGARDEN area of operations was no exception.
59
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During the time the Allies were debating strategy,
consolidating logistics and deciding upon the next course of
action, German defenses along the front stiffened.

On 6

September orders were issued from the Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command), subordinating
the First Parachute Army, previously a training unit, to Army
Group B, under the command of General Walter Model.

The

First Parachute Army, under General Kurt Student, was
assigned to defend along the Albert Canal between Brussels
and Maastricht.

Further the message outlined the revised

order of battle, identifying the 3rd, 5th, and 6th Parachute
Divisions; LXXXVIII Corps with 719th and 344th Infantry
Divisions; battle groups from the Netherlands formed from SS
training units and Herman Goring Training Regiment.
Supporting would be ten anti-aircraft batteries, equipped
with the 88mm multi-purpose gun, deadly when utilized in an
anti-tank role.

60

Signals Intelligence confirmed the British Second Army
intelligence reports concerning the massive withdrawal of the
German Fifteenth Army from the Antwerp port islands.

By the

time of MARKET-GARDEN execution, reconnaissance and decrypts
estimated over 70,000 troops and supporting weapons now were
in frontal defensive positions along the Albert Canal after
being withdrawn from the Scheldt islands of Walcheren and
South Beveland.

On 16 and 17 September, two of von Zangen's

divisions arrived to help bolster Generaloberst Kurt
60
ULTRA intercepts DEFE 3/221, XL 9247, XL 9466, (8 September 1944). The author has
obtained copies of selected ULTRA intercepts from both the Public Records Office, London and
Hartenstein Museum. For the purpose of footnotes and bibliography the Public Records Office
file number shall be used along with the number (if applicable) and date of message.
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Student's First Parachute Army; 59th Infantry Division under
Generalleutnant Walter Poppe and 245th Infantry Division
commanded by Oberst Gerhard Kegler.

Badly equipped and under

strength, they took up positions indepth near Hertogenbosch
and Eindhoven respectively. 61
ULTRA had tracked the orderly withdraw of the 9th
'Hohenstaufen' and 10th 'Frundsberg' SS Divisions of the II
SS Corps, commanded by Generalleutnant der Waffen SS, Willi
Bittrich.

Having been badly mauled during attempts to defeat

the Allied landing at Normandy and the long withdrawal under
contact, the divisions were reduced to battalion size and in
desperate need of resupply of personnel and equipment.

on 5

September the Government Code and Cipher School Station X at
Bletchley Park in Buckinghamshire released a message
monitored from Model's headquarters:
Army Group B order quoted by FL I VO {Luftwaffe
Liaison Officer] 1730 hrs 5th. (1) Stab Panzer Army
Five with subordinated headquarters 58th Panzer
Corps to transfer beginning 6th to area Koblenz for
rest and refit by C-in-c West.
( 2) Headquarters
2nd SS Panzer Corps subordinated Army Group B to
transfer to Eindhoven to rest and refit in
cooperation with General of Panzer Troops West and
direct rest and refit of 2nd and 116th Panzer
Divisions, 9th SS Panzer Division and 217th Heavy
Assault Gun Abteilung.
(COMMENTS: Elements these
divisions and 10th SS Panzer Division ordered 4th
to area Venlo-Arnhem-Hertogenbosch for refit in XL
9188 ) 62

ULTRA intercepts DEFE 31222. XL 9466 (8 September 1944); XL 9502 (9 September 1944);
DEFE 3/225 (14 September 1944).
82 ULTRA intercept OEFE 31221 XL 9245 (5September1944).
51
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Additional messages identified Oosterbeek (near Arnhem) as
the location of General Model's headquarters. 63

In fact this

message was transmitted low priority due to the fact that no
one from Bletchley Park had knowledge of the impending
airborne operations.

The exact date and time of its receipt

by forward units is unclear.

Model's presence on the

battlefield would prove crucial as he traveled to Bittrich's
headquarters where he coordinated the counter-attack against
Nijmegan and Arnhem.
ULTRA also provided valuable information on German
intelligence efforts and their perceptions of Allied
intentions.

By the end of the first week of September, the

German analysis of future enemy operations had pointed to a
thrust northwards to cut off German forces in Western
Holland, as proven by ULTRA:
Allies in German reports:
(A)
addressed to
unspecified on evening 9th.
30 British Corps (2nd
Br Army) between Antwerp and Hasselt.
Bringing up
further Corps possible.
Eleven to fourteen
divisions with eight to nine hundred tanks.
Photo
recce task (COMMENT: further specification of area
incomplete but includes "west of Nijmegan" and
"Wesel" to cut off and surround German forces
Western Netherlands).••

Although this assessment was soon altered, and the airborne
assault was a complete surprise, if proper consideration had
been given to signals intelligence during the planning phase
the Allies would have been aware of the importance the
def ending forces placed upon the MARKET-GARDEN area of
operations.
53

64

ULTRA intercept DEFE 31225 (15 September 1944).
ULTRA intercept DEFE 3/225 HP 242 (15 September 1944)
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Signals intelligence collection for Operation MARKETGARDEN was more than adequate to support mission planning.
Providing unit identification, location, strength and
mission, is the commanders ultimate goal for his intelligence
assets.

The collection in preparation for Arnhem

accomplished all of this.

If observed carefully SIGINT even

disproves the assumption of a defeated opponent:
Taking the signals for this period as a whole • • •
it must be said that while there are many
references to shortage of fuel, ammunition and
other supplies, and evidence of desperate efforts
to reorganize a coherent defense there is little to
confirm that the Germans had lost the will to fight
or to justify Montgomery's optimistic statements
about the enemy streaming homewards in headlong
disorder."'

Decisions by the 21st Army Group to devalue the importance of
ULTRA directly conflicted with the immense faith the source
had gained in other campaigns.

This ineptness can be

explained as an overly euphoric atmosphere in which
operational planning was conducted in a vacuum, with little
regard for the enemy.

Ralph Bennett's outstanding summary is

worthy of reprint here:
The exhaustive study of western ULTRA from 19441945 thus involved has gradually forced me to the
unexpected conclusion that there is a striking
difference between the heed paid to ULTRA before
and after the great advance from Falaise.
ULTRA' s warnings were disregarded over the capture
of the Antwerp docks and before Arnhem and the
Ardennes offensive with unfortunate consequences on
each occasion.••
es
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Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, p. 349.
Bennett, Ultra in the West. pp. 14~ 15.
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Buman

Intelligence Collection

(BUMIH'.r)

The German belief that their version of the Enigma
machine was completely secure created an extremely accurate
intelligence source where authenticity of information was
virtually assured.

In fact, if ULTRA information proved

inaccurate it can be attributed to the 'fog of war' and
German commanders not having a firm and complete grasp upon
their own situation.

If SIGINT represented a streamlined

source of intelligence, human intelligence was often the
opposite.

The oldest of the intelligence disciplines, HUMINT

is often shrouded in mystery and intrigue, tempered by the
unique individuals that take part in the deadly game of
espionage.

Other sources of human intelligence available to

combat commanders included information obtained from
prisoners of war, document exploitation, use of counterintelligence agents and in the case of Europe 1944 the vast
resistance movements in occupied countries.
The resistance movements within Holland were varied and
quite diverse, ranging from the conservative and highly
political Orde Dienst (Order Service) to the radical sabotage
organization Raad van Verzet in het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden (The Council of Resistance in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands). 67

Although active throughout the war, the value

of information provided by these organizations was held
severely suspect by the British.

This was partly due to the

Werner Warmbrunn, The Dutch Under German Occupation 1940-1945 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1963). Provides an outstanding portrait of the underground movements, their
motives and methods, from the start of German occupation until liberation.
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1941 penetration of a major resistance network by the Abwehr,
the military counter-intelligence department of the OKW. 68
In what was to become known as Operation North Pole,
headed by Abwehr Major Hermann Giskes, British and Dutch
agents were captured and forced to transmit false information
back to the Special Operations Executive (SOE) in London. 69
Shockingly, agents transmitted their messages omitting all
prior arranged security codes, which identified that the
agent had been compromised, and these blatantly obvious hints
were ignored in London.

The size of North Pole continued to

grow and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) dropped more
agents and equipment into Holland, which was inturn captured
by the German counter-intelligence forces. 10
It was not until August 1943, when two agents managed to
escape and travel three months across occupied Europe until
reaching Switzerland where they contacted the SOE, that North
Pole finally ended.

Although many other networks operated

successfully and provided highly accurate and trustworthy
intelligence, the British never again sought to exploit such
sources.

On 6 September Prince Bernard of Holland,

commander-in-Chief of Dutch military forces in exile,
approached Montgomery during the preparation phase of the
airborne invasion, with extensive information on enemy
disposition and size from Resistance forces.

Alarmed by

coolness in which he was received and the casual dismissal of
Hermann Giskes, London Calling North Pole (New York: The British Book Centre Inc., 1953),
pp. 160-173
69 The Special Operation Executive was a sub-section of the Military Intelligence Department of
the War Office responsible for the training, deployment, and handling of under-cover intelligence
agents operating in the occupied territories.
10 Giskes, London Calling North Pole, 160-173.
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the information, Bernard was convinced that Montgomery would
allow nothing to interfere with his already established
plans. ' 1
By the end of the first week in September, Dutch
underground reports of enemy armor consolidating around
Arnhem were forwarded to London.

This was later followed by

a more detailed report on 15 September which stated, "S.S.
Div Hohenstruff [Obviously Hohenstauffen) along Ijssel, subunits observed between Arnhem and Zutphen-Apeldoorn road. " 12
American forces during the preparation phase gave much
credence to HUMINT reports from Holland, gaining a valuable
insight as to possible threats in their areas.' 3

Even the

British 1st Airborne Division, rightly concerned with reports
of enemy armor in Arnhem, thought the information being
provided by the Dutch important enough to include in their
Planning Intelligence Summary, dated 14 September 1944:
Rather fragmentary Dutch reports confirm that there
are twenty thousand German troops East of the
Ijssel in the HENGELO-BOCHOLT-CLEVE area where
tanks have previously been reported.
The same
sources also state that defenses are being prepared
along the line of the I jssel which is a very
formidable river obstacle. 74

The use of Dutch sources to confirm rumors of armor in Arnhem
would earn the 1st Airborne Division Intelligence Officer,
Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 508-510.
Information on Dutch Resistance messages are often referred to in secondary sources without
citations. This information comes from observation by the author of the Resistance collection at
the Hartenstein Airborne Museum in Oosterbeek, Holland. In addition to observing transcripts of
Resistance message traffic photo were made of a situation map sent through enemy lines to
British forces and returned after the war. It is unclear as to how high of a level this map attained
and when, but it at least was in the possession of element of XXX Corps prior to 17 September.
73 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET)" ( 11 September 1944), 1.
74 1st (British) Airborne Division Headquarters, "1 Airborne Division Planning Intelligence
Summary No. 2 (Operation MARKET)" (14 September 1944), 1.
11
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Major Maguire, a rebuke when the Airborne Corps published
their next intelligence summary later that day:
ENEMY opposition to the development of Resistance
has been strong in HOLLAND as a result of this
situation in the country and the extensive
penetration of the population during the years
before the war.
It has therefore been impossible
to develop a widespread network of Resistance in
HOLLAND with W/T communications working to the U.K.
The organization ( Orde Dienst] has, however, been
in existence for a considerable time and is thought
to have been penetrated by the Germans •
"

The Airborne Corps warns its subordinate, the 1st Airborne
Division, against the use of Dutch HUMINT.

This comes at a

time when the 1st Airborne Division is seeking information
from any source possible to provide an accurate picture of
enemy activities since higher headquarters refusal to
disseminate intelligence.
The limited offensive activities throughout the Second
Army area of operations resulted in fewer enemy prisoners of
war (EPW) interrogations.

The number of prisoners processed

through the EPW cages dropped dramatically from 6563 on 10
September to just 8 2. on 16 September. 16

But despite the

decrease, Second Army was able to confirm order of battle
information provided by SIGINT on the withdraw of elements of
the Fifteenth Army and formation of the First Parachute
Army. 77

75 British Airborne Corps Headquarters, "Appendix C (Resistance in Holland) to HQ Airborne
Troops Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation MARKET)" (14 September 1944), 1.
76 Second Army Headquarters, "Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 105" (17 September

1944), 2.
77

Second Army Headquarters, "Second Army Intelligence Summary No. 102" (14 September

1944), 1.
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With the reduction of the number of prisoners, it stands
to reason that the number of documents available for
exploitation would also be reduced.

The 82nd Airborne

Division published an Order of Battle Summary on 11 September
1944, based in part, on document exploitation.

It

illustrates the extent of German transition from withdrawal
to defense:
There is no doubt that the enemy has made a
remarkable recovery within the last few days, at
any rate in the 21st Army Group area
•A
captured document indicates that the degree of
control exercised over regrouping and collecting of
the apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army
were little short of remarkable.
Furthermore, the
fighting capacity of the new Battle Groups formed
from the remnants of battered divisions seems
unimpaired.
1•

Imagery

Intelligence Collect.ion

(IMIH!r)

Imagery Intelligence provided outstanding collection in
preparation for MARKET-GARDEN.

IMINT collected directly on

German forces, included disposition of II SS-Panzer Corps,
and specific, minute details of enemy defensive preparations.
Additionally, this discipline provided excellent collection
for mapping, bridge reports, and drop zone/landing zone
evaluations.

In World War II, commanders relied heavily on

!MINT; they trusted it.

Curiously, even !MINT was

disregarded in key planning sequences for MARKET-GARDEN.
!MINT enjoyed great advantage over SIGINT and HUMINT.
The simple fact is that commanders believed what they could
82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET}" (11 September 1944), 1.
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see with their own eyes.
inherently reliable.

In their estimation, it was

Roy Stanley explains the photo

intelligence appeal:
The caveat uphoto confirmed" on a World War II
order-of-battle target analysis, situation report,
or intelligence estimate was a hallmark of
authenticity.
No other source of intelligence was
so readily accepted by the brass.
While the
analysis of communications, radar signals, or
whispered conversations might be every bit as
expert and valid, nothing carried the impact of a
photograph."

In addition to reliability, IMINT enjoyed status as a
stand-alone intelligence source.

For this reason, it was an

excellent confirming or corroborating collection method.
Stanley relates this important point:
As a source of intelligence, photography stood
alone.
No other source of intelligence was used
throughout so much of the world, was in such
general use at all echelons, had such a broad scope
of application to combat, or was so much a part of
operations planning at all levels. •0

Given the outstanding reputation IMINT enjoyed for
reliability and conunand support, it is unusual that this
valuable intelligence was ignored.

In planning for MARKET-

GARDEN, General Browning, British Airborne Corps Conunander,
did just that - - discounted !MINT collection on his key
objective.
Browning's G-2, Major Urquhart, understood the
importance of photo intelligence for planning.

He stated:

"Air photographs, constantly updated, were the basis of most
79
80

Roy M. Stanley, World war 11 Photo Intelligence (New York: Charles Scribner Sons, 1981), p. 2.
Ibid., p.3.
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operational planning, and I spent much of my time at the
Medmenham Photographic Interpretation Centre. " 81

It was

normally an important collection source for planning.
As MARKET-GARDEN approached, Urquhart became concerned
about the multi-discipline indicators that there was German
armor in Arnhem. 82

In response, he tasked aerial photo

intelligence to target the objective area, in hopes of
convincing his commander of the dangerous development.
Urquhart describes this episode:
To convince Browning of the danger, I decided to
try to get actual pictures of the German armour
near the 1st Airborne Division's dropping zone, and
asked for oblique photographs to be taken of the
area at a low altitude by the acknowledged experts
in this art, an RAF spitfire squadron •
• The
pictures when they arrived confirmed my worst
fears.
There were German tanks and armoured
vehicles parked under the trees within easy range
of the 1st Airborne Division's main dropping zone.
I
rushed to General Browning with this new
evidence, only to be treated once again as a
nervous child suffering from a nightmare. 83

Urquhart directed an outstanding photo intelligence
collection effort.

Although Browning rebuffed the

intelligence, it was clearly available.
Terrain analysis, which is derived from a combination of
all intelligence disciples, is a critical function of
planning staffs.

This is particularly true when planning

operations involving mechanized forces.

Terrain will often

offer distinct advantages to either the attacker or defender
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Brian Urquhart, A Life In Peace and War (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 66.
Ibid., pp. 70-73.
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Ibid., pp. 72-73.

81

44

and will impact upon both forces courses of action.

Clearly,

intelligence staffs planning MARKET-GARDEN understood the
impact and limitations posed by the polder regions of
Holland.

It is also clear that Montgomery and his

subordinate maneuver commanders had knowledge of the terrain,
which they believed to be irrelevant to their upcoming
operations.
The planning process for MARKET-GARDEN was an absolute
failure.

One example of this is the unrealistic mission

assigned to ground forces for GARDEN, namely the relief of
the 1st Airborne Division within twenty-four hours.

In order

to accomplish this, XXX Corps would have to fight their way
64 miles through the strengthening enemy defenses along a
single elevated causeway, through a polder region riddled
with streams, canals, and marshlands that restricted off road
movement.

In an after action report to General Eisenhower,

General Brereton, Commander of the First Allied Airborne
Army, points out the necessity to quickly link-up ground and
airborne assaults; in the Netherlands, terrain is a key
factor: "Therefore, it is vital that the airborne thrust be
joined with the ground thrust in a minimum amount of time to
avoid undue losses. "

84

Brereton, like many participants,

consider Operation MARKET, the airborne portion a success,
but the overall operation a failure because of the poor
execution of the ground portion Operation GARDEN.
It does not take an expert tactician to examine a
1:100,000 scale map of the area to determine that it is
First Allied Airborne Army Headquarters, "First Allied Airborne Army Report on Operations in
Holland: September - November 1944" (22December1944.), p. 3.
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unfavorable terrain for armored attacks. However, most of the
strategic, even Army level planning was conducted on maps of
1:250,000 scale or larger.

On such maps Holland appears as a

vast plain void of large scale vegetation and changes in
elevation which so often constricts mechanized movement.
This oversight is clearly not the case for MARKET-GARDEN.
The First Allied Airborne Army in analyzing the terrain
points to the numerous advantages it held for the defender:
The enemy must depend on the canal and river lines
if he is to achieve an orderly withdrawal.
The
capture of bridges intact is therefore of vital
importance, and the difficulties of cross-country
movement makes the enemy's task of denying them to
the ground forces that much easier. 85

American units derived similar conclusions with their terrain
analysis; "roads are all embanked, and vehicular movement off
of them in the low portions is impossible. " 86
Commanders understood the terrain disadvantages; they
chose to ignore them.

General Brian Horrocks, XXX Corps

Commander, was responsible for leading the ground assault for
Operation GARDEN.

It was his responsibility to fight through

and relieve the airborne divisions.

As he records in a post-

war account, he understood the terrain, but disregarded the
implications:
I knew that it would be a very tough battle;
especially so, owing to the nature of the country,
with its numerous water obstacles and the single
main road available for thousands of vehicles • • .
87

First Allied Airborne Army Headquarters, "Subject: Enemy Situation on the Second Army
Front", (15 September 1944), p. 2.
86 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 16, (Tactical Study of the Terrain) to Field Order
No. 11 (Operation MARKET)", (11September1944), p. 1.
87 Brian Horrocks, Corps Commander (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 101.
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Horrocks later recognized that an indirect approach from
Nijmegan to Arnhem would have been better, carrying out a
"left hook against the German forces on the western edge of
the airborne perimeter. " 88
Clearly, terrain analysis was accurate. 89
reason for it not to be.

There was no

British and American units had

Dutch military liaison officers who were completely familiar
with the terrain and had studied its military application.
In fact, for several years at Dutch war colleges an exam was
given with the final question pertaining to an armored attack
from Nijmegan to Arnhem.

If the answer provided involved an

attack along the main road leading between the two the
student failed. 90

Terrain analysis is just another example

where the commander understood the enormous risks involved,
but accepted them in order to make the attempt possible.

Ibid., p. 125.
Perhaps the one notable exception was the decision not to drop 1st Airborne Division forces
close to the Arnhem bridge. It was believed that the ground would not support glider landings,
due to its softness. Once the division arrived they concluded that a limited number (Battalion size
element - 38 gliders),of glider could have safely landed and possibly been in position for
immediate capture of the bridge.
90 Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 508.
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CHAPTER IV

COMMAND CLIMATE

Military commanders during a time of war, regardless of
the level which they command, have the unenviable task of
making life and death decisions in the normal course of their
duties.

The burden of command, as it is often called, has

profound and sometimes lasting effects upon those who have
accepted this awesome responsibility.

Those that confront

the death and destruction at a lower and more personal level
often bear the weight of this burden more heavily.

This is

not to say that any commander is immune to the effects or
event that they might approach their responsibility without a
sense of the grave consequences that their decision hold.

It

is only to state that the farther removed from the outgrowth,
the easier it is to dismiss them from the mind.
The commander is a person that through their style of
leadership has a tremendous influence not only upon their own
unit, but reverberations are felt in both senior and
subordinate commands alike.

This fact is extremely evident

when examining the Allied command structure in 1944.

Before

illuminating on the analysis and dissemination of the
collected intelligence, it is a prerequisite to have an
understanding of the command climate which directly
contributed to the wide acceptance of a plan so chocked-full
of false assumptions and tactical errors.
The relationship between a commander and his staff is
the foundation of military planning.

Commanders rely upon

staff officers to provide them with highly accurate
information and expert analysis based on sound judgment and
knowledge.

Although they do not have to personally admire
48

one another, a common professional working relationship must
be developed based on a mutual trust and confidence.

The

same holds true for commander's relationships with senior and
subordinate commanders as well.
As previously discussed, the relationship between
Eisenhower and Montgomery was at best strained.

However,

this was not a conflict which was confined to only the two
commanders, but spread to encompass theirs staffs as well as
supporters throughout the Allied armies.

The staff rivalries

that developed affected the working relationship between
them.

Each began to produced estimates that supported their

commander in the battle against the other.

This rivalry

caused the staffs to grow farther apart and greatly influence
the all important intra-staff communication process.
Bernard L. Montgomery was no novice to the world of the
intelligence staff, he retained a keen understanding of its
workings and value.

This no doubt was a carry over from his

days as a divisional staff Intelligence Officer during the
First World War.

While commanding the British Eighth Army,

Montgomery learned first hand the immeasurable value of ULTRA
in his battles against Rommel's vaunted Afrika Korps.

As

SIGINT provided information on Rommel's situations and plans
that directly contributed to Montgomery's victories at
Alamein, Mareth, Medenine and later in Sicily; Montgomerys
appreciation for the work of the intelligence professional
deepened.

This appreciation was visible during the
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preparation phase of Operation OVERLORD. 91
Given this background for appreciation of intelligence,
one might find Montgomery's actions in the preparation for
MARKET-GARDEN strange or abnormal, this is not the case.
Montgomery's Chief of Staff, General de Guingand, noted that
as early as 1933, his commander had an impulsive behavior
regarding the use of intelligence during planning:
Strange to say--since Montgomery's reputation is so
rooted
iron
discipline
and
firmly
in his
cautiousness as a commander-- I found from the
beginning that side by side with meticulous
professionalism went a certain tendency to make
hasty decisions, as much on the field as off it • •
Which it was my privilege to perceive and often to
mitigate as his Chief of Staff.
in the Canal
Brigade Exercise of 1933 when.
.our Brigadier,
Montgomery and I attempted to locate and bring
battle to an 'enemy force.'
As we could not locate
these forces I was loath to alter our disposition;
but by nightfall Montgomery became impatient and
prepared orders for our own force to set out.
It
was only by perseverance and good fortune that I
managed at last to get an RAF aeroplane to
reconnoitre on our behalf; and to my intense relief
it sighted our 'enemy' in laager.
.I had managed
to persuade Montgomery to await the plane's return;
and with this information we were subsequently able
to rout our opponents, thus earning Montgomery
considerable kudos."

Montgomery was strongly resistant to change, based on
intelligence, once he had derived his battle plan.

His staff

The tremendous research of F. H Hinsley provides evidence to the extent of Montgomery's
reliance on intelligence for the Africa, Mediterranean and European theaters. F. H. Hinstey, British
Intelligence in the Second World War Its Influence on Strategy and Ooerations, 4 vols. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), vol. 3, part II. (Operation OVERLORD was the code name
given to the 6 June 1944 Allied invasion of France).
92 De Guingand, From Brass Hat To Bowler Hat, p. 2.
91
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officers, understanding this developed methods of dealing
with their boss:
Both General de Guingand and Brigadier Bill
Williams, Field Marshal Montgomery's intelligence
advisors, had to develop special 'showmanship
techniques' --a sort of 'Monty language' that would
enable them to
provide
him with
accurate
intelligence while making it more acceptable to him
to authorize the necessary changes
in his
93
meticulously prepared operational plans.

General de Guingand was a personable officer, well
respected by both the Americans and British alike.

As

Montgomery's Chief of Staff, he was able to handle the
diverse personalities within the staff and broker between
21st Army Group and SHAEF.

He served to restrain and calm

his often impulsive commander, while allowing him to save
face.

As MARKET-GARDEN drew nearer and staff officers were

unable to convince Montgomery of the futileness of the plan,
they called upon de Guingand to intervene:
Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support this
(Operation MARKET-GARDEN], Montgomery's supposed
master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in
Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him.
I
attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too
many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was
warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland,
that German armoured units were stationed there.
However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely
replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't
know what's going on 1 ' 9•

Montgomery despite the appeals of numerous informed
individuals, was determined to execute a tactically flawed
93
94
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plan that was doomed to failure because he perceived it as
his last hope to prove the single thrust would work.
Brigadier Bill Williams, 21st Army Group Intelligence
Officer, as early as 10 September sought to alter the plan
when he appealed unsuccessfully to Montgomery.

Convinced of

the accuracy of his information Williams turned his appeal
toward David Belchem, acting Chief of Staff.

Jointly they

implored Montgomery to be reasonable, their concerns were
brushed aside. 95
There were others who would attempt to rationalize with
Montgomery, but the end was always the same.

As previously

noted Price Bernard presented his evidence on 6 September to
no avail:
The British were simply not impressed by our
negative attitudes.
• The prevailing attitude was
'Don't worry, old boy, we'll get this thing
cracking'. • • the British considered us a bunch of
idiots for daring to question their military
tactics.
• the average Englishman doesn't like
being told by a bloody foreigner that he's wrong.••

The strongest appeal was made just prior to mission
execution.

Concerned with ULTRA and Dutch underground

reports and believing that armor units were in Arnhem and
with new equipment, Major General Kenneth Strong, SHAEF
Intelligence Officer, brought his concerns to Eisenhower.
The Supreme Commander ordered Strong and General Smith to
proceed at once to Montgomery's headquarters, which they did.
Smith requested first that Montgomery reinforce the Arnhem
drop and when that failed he recommended cancellation.
95
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Powell, The Devil's Birthday, p. 43.
Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, pp. 508~509.
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Convinced of the future success that would be his and annoyed
by SHAEF descending into operational and tactical levels of
war, Montgomery refused. 97
This ignoring of intelligence filtered down to even the
tactical level.

As optimism swept through the conunand,

subordinate commanders, seeing the confidence held in the
operation by Montgomery, opted for the same course.

Lewis

Brereton, conunanding the First Allied Airborne Army, like
SHAEF was under pressure to use the highly trained and
valuable airborne troops.

Both General Marshall, U.S. Chief

of Staff and General Hap Arnold, Chief of Staff U.S. Army Air
Corps, had an interest in the inunediate use of the elite
forces which they had fought hard to obtain. 98 After the
cancellation of fifteen straight missions, MARKET-GARDEN was
welcomed.

Brereton, briefing his staff and the Corps

Conunander, General Browning, on 10 September, pushed planning
and execution ahead by stating, "because there is so little
time, major decisions arrived at now must stand - and these
have to be made inunediately. " 99
The relations between General Frederick "Boy" Browning
and his commander were at an all time low.

Browning

previously upset by the lack of planning and preparation for
Operation LINNET 100

,

scheduled for execution just thirty-six

hours after receiving the mission, had resigned in protest.
When the operation was canceled he withdrew his resignation,
Kenneth Strong, Intelligence At The Top (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
1969), p. 202.
98 Pogue, Supreme Command, p. 279.
99 Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, p. 121.
100 Operation Linnet called for the 1st Airborne Corps to land and drop the gap between the
Dutch town of Maastricht and the German city of Aachen.
97
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but still harbored ill feeling toward his American
commander. 101 Browning again found himself in a hastily planned
airborne attack, this time commanded by British generals.
With the euphoric atmosphere about, his strong desire to
command in battle and his previous resignation, Browning was
not prepared again to challenge the decisions of senior
commanders.
This decision would prove tragic, for Browning as the
Corps Commander, an expert in airborne tactics, should have
been the person to elevate the firmest objections.

This is

even more true considering that Browning was perhaps the best
informed commander on the enemy situation largely because of
the efforts of his Intelligence Officer, Major Brian
Urquhart.

A twenty-five year old, energetic and bright

officer, Urquhart worked feverishly to compile the most
complete intelligence picture possible for the impending
operation.
Concerned with an intelligence summary produced by 21st
Army Group on 9 September, that reported the 9th and 10th SS
Panzer Divisions refitting in Arnhem, Urquhart set out to
confirm these reports using other intelligence disciplines.
He gained access to reports derived from ULTRA intercepts
(ULTRA was authorized only at Army level), and confirmed them
by using Dutch HUMINT reports.

Recalling his attempts to

warn his commander, he writes:
When I informed General Browning and Colonel Walch
of this development, they seemed little concerned
and became quite annoyed when I insisted on the
Lewis Brereton, The Brereton Diaries {New York: William Morrow & Company, 1946), pp. 337340.
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danger.
They said, as I remember, that I should
not worry unduly, that the reports were probably
wrong, and that in any case the German troops were
refitting and not up to much fighting.
This
reaction confirmed my worst suspicions about the
attitude of Browning and his staff, and I concluded
that Browning's ambition to command in battle was a
major factor both in the conception of 'MarketGarden' and in his refusal to take the latest news
on German opposition seriously. 102

Relentless and convinced that a grave tragedy was about
to befall the 1st Airborne Division, Major Urquhart requested
the aerial reconnaissance photos discussed in Chapter III.
Three days later when the photos clearly showed arm.or within
striking distance of the landing zones in Arnhem, Urquhart
pressed the issue and was, "once again treated as a nervous
child suffering from a nightmare.

I was beginning to be

regarded as a spoilsport or worse. " 103 As a reward for his
diligence and detailed work, Urquhart was ordered by Browning
to go on sick leave, reportably suffering from nervous
exhaustion.

He was recalled by Browning on 22 September and

joined the Airborne Corps headquarters, where everyone was so
painfully aware of the presence of enemy arm.or in Arnhem. 10 •

Major Urquhart would later state that he, "did Browning a grave injustice. I did not realize until
more than thirty years later...that 'Market-Garden' was the offspring of the ambition of
Montgomery, who desperately wanted a British success to end the war.· B. Urquhart, A Life In
Peace and War. p. 72.
103 Ibid., p. 273.
1°" It is true that Brian Urquhart was young for a Brigade level Intelligence Officer, however he had
proven himself quite astute and although emotional in his convictions, his work by alt accounts
were based on sound judgment and research. These qualities would serve him well as Under
Secretary General of the United Nations. Those that supported Urquhart at the time were in no
position to help his cause. At First Allied Airborne Army headquarters. Wing Commander Asher
Lee was alarmed to see the level of enemy activity in Arnhem, when studying the ULTAA
intercepts. He presented his evidence to Brereton who sent him to Belgium to report to 21st
Army Group where it fell upon deaf ears.
102
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This would not be the last appeal to reach General
Browning's headquarters.

The conunander of the 1st Airborne

Division, Major General Roy Urquhart (no relation to Brian
Urquhart), was rightly concerned with the rumors (at
divisional level they lacked the intelligence reports) about
Arnhem and the lack of hard intelligence. "I knew extremely
little of what was going on in and around Arnhem and my
intelligence staff were scratching around for morsels of
information. " 105 The command climate within the division was
similar to that throughout the Allied Armies, with the
exception that with the preparation for and subsequent
cancellation of fifteen straight missions the soldiers began
to lose focus:
By the time we went on Market-Garden we couldn't
have cared less.
I mean I really shouldn't admit
that, but we really couldn't
.we became
callous.
Every operation was planned to the best
of our ability in every way.
But we qot so bored,
and the troops were more bored than we were. • .We
had approached the state of mind when we weren't
thinking as hard about the risks and we possibly
had done earlier. i•fi

The Brigade commanders under Urquhart's command did seem
to care.

Brigadier Shan Hackett, commander of the 4th Para

Brigade and Major General Stanislaw Sosabowski, commander of
the Independent Polish Parachute Brigade, both had expressed
concerns during the planning for MARKET-GARDENS predecessor,
COMET.

After being briefed on the operation, which had no

mention of enemy forces Sosabowski bellowed, "But the
105
106

Urquhart, Arnhem (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1958), pp. 7-9.
Ibid., pp. 9-11.
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Germans, General, the Germans." 107 Hackett recalls the planning
process of those planning the airborne operations, "their
plans to put down an airborne division were impeccable. • .As
cooks prepare a superb dish and then add salt and pepper ••
• They prepared a superb deployment and then added a few
Germans. " 106

Upon hearing the reservations of his subordinate

commanders, Urquhart suggested a meeting with Browning.

When

Sosabowski told the Corps Commander his concerns, Browning
replied lightly; "The Red Devils and the Polish Paratroopers
can do anything. " 109
This was the command climate in which MARKET-GARDEN
evolved, a command climate that greatly effected not only the
planning process but the analysis of intelligence as well.
Subordinate units held reservations about the plan and the
enemy that was now a formidable opponent, especially for
lightly armed paratroopers.

Commanders were reluctant to

voice these concerns because of a confidence in their
commanders and an unwillingness to spoil the 'airborne party'
and when a select few did they were brushed aside.
Intelligence Analysis

and Dissemination

During the short planning process, the ground situation
for the German army rapidly changed, as the Allied advance
temporarily paused.

In the short span of a week (from 10-17

September), intelligence analysis indicated a change in
German defensive posture and reorganization effort.
101
108
109

Although

Stanislaw Sosabowski, Freely I Served (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1982), pp. 139-143.
Shan Hackett, I Was A Stranger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), p. 14.
Sosabowski, Freely I Served, p. 143.
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this intelligence had been accumulating for several week, the
intelligence analysis prior to 16 September 1944 was not
worded strongly enough to provoke reconsideration.
A difference in the level of optimism exists between
SHAEF Weekly Intelligence Summaries Number 25 (9 September
1944) and Number 26 (16 September 1944).

These key documents

were published, respectively, one day before planning began
and one day before the operation commenced.

Weekly

Intelligence Summary Number 25 is broadly optimistic about
conditions on the Western Front.

Number 26 is more guarded.

Unfortunately, 16 September was too late to affect planning
for the operation and not strong enough to induce
cancellation.
The following excerpt from Summary No. 25 provides an
example of the optimistic analysis:
The past week of war has seen developments on every
front which closely threaten Germany herself, and
it is quite clear now that the encirclement battle
for the Reich is beginning as collapses are
reported from every part of the fighting front •
. on 2 September, on the German First Army front,
the enemy was still falling back under Allied
pressure at such a rate that even vital operations
orders were out of date before they were received
by the uni ts concerned. 110

Summary No. 26 is still optimistic but notes the rapidly
reorganizing German Army, the influx of troops, and the new
defensive posture:
on 8 September the fighting on the MOSELLE in the
NANCY-METZ area was very heavy and continued
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, "Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 25" (9
September 1944), p. 1.
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without let up for the remainder of the week.
Considerable defenses were constructed and several
new formations were identified in this area which
was
receiving the highest priority for
the
allocation of both offensive and defensive type
units.
.Along the ALBERT CANAL some resistance
was offered and 719 Infantry Division went into the
line, coming down from HOLLAND to do its bit in
halting the Allied Northward rush.
Fifteenth Army
in its coastal strip was making quite good progress
in its withdrawal across to WALCHEREN and BEVELAND,
and eventually to what was left of the ALBERT-CANAL
line where parachute units were beginning to
appear,
prestaging the arrival of the First
Parachute Army. 111

Summary No. 26 also finally acknowledged SIGINT, !MINT and
HUMINT reporting of the II SS Panzer Corps with the following
paragraph:
9 SS Panzer Division, and with it presumably 10,
has been reported as withdrawing altogether to the
ARNHEM area of HOLLAND: there they will probably
collect some new tanks from the depot reported in
the area of CLEVES. 112

If General Strong was concerned enough to raise the issue of
armor units in Arnhem with Eisenhower and even visit
Montgomery, why then did he wait until 16 September before
publishing it in an intelligence summary?
Some historian argue that this analysis was too late.
Forest Pogue noted: "Only on the very eve of the attack was a
warning note sounded." 113 It is wrong to conclude that there
were no warnings in intelligence reports, combined with
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces, "Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 26"
(16 September 1944), pp.1-2.
112 Ibid. p.7.
113 Pogue, The SuoremQ Command, p. 283.
111
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terrain limitations, which should have prescribed caution.
The day operational planning began for MARKET-GARDEN (10
September 1944), the SHAEF Daily G-2 Report clearly noted a
change in the German army on the western front:
There is also some evidence that units recently
evacuated across the SCHELDT are already being
committed on the ALBERT Canal. • .After a period of
collapse, German forces in the WEST now show
increasing signs of resistance as the Allies
approach the frontiers of Germany.
Enemy has now
been able to form a cohesive front at least as far
SOUTH as NANCY, though the line is weakly held in
parts.
The enemy is fairly successful in
evacuating 15 Army to WALCHEREN, and it is
estimated that some 40-50, 000 troops may get across
with proportion (sic] of their equipment.
.Enemy
formations along ALBERT Canal are not sufficiently
good class to hold the line but the Germans must
now give greater priority to the area covering
approaches to the RUHR and reinforcements to be
expected include the reappearance of some of the
armour the enemy has withdrawn. 114

Important indicators were therefore present during the early
planning stages for MARKET-GARDEN.

The German Army in the

West was transitioning from withdrawal to reorganization and
defense.

The Western Conunand was reinforcing the Albert

Canal--the area through which XXX Corps was preparing to
attack.

Soldiers in the line were of doubtful quality but

armored reinforcements to protect approaches to the Ruhr
(Montgomery's objective) were available.

These indicators,

coupled with terrain analysis, should have concerned Allied
conunanders.
114

At the very least, it should have caused them to

SHAEF, "G2 Report No. 98w (1200hrs10 September to 1200hrs11September1944), pp. 1·

2.

60

carefully revise their plans.

At the strategic as well as

operational level, the conunand climate and rampant euphoria
rode roughshod over intelligence and analysis.
Weak analysis at the operational level trickled down to
the corps units.

Here, the conunand climate, particularly in

the Airborne Corps, also hampered the planning process.

In

some cases, division-level analysis was more guarded and
fairly accurate.
The enemy situation included in the Operation
Instruction for the Airborne Corps was fairly accurate, but
was contradictory in its closing sentences.

Certainly, the

conunand climate and prevailing optimism were responsible for
this contradiction.

The following paragraph is taken from

Operation Instruction No. 1:
The enemy is fighting determinedly along the
general line of ALBERT and ESCAUT Canals from
inclusive ANTWERP to inclusive MAASTRICHT.
His
line is held by the remnants of some good
divisions, including Parachute Divisions, and by
new arrivals from HOLLAND.
They are fighting well
but have very few reserves.
The total armoured
strength is probably not more than 50-100 tanks,
mostly Mark IV.
There is every sign of the enemy
strengthening the defenses of the river and canal
lines through ARNHEM and NIJMEGAN, especially with
flak, but the troops manning them are not numerous
and many of low category.
The flak is sited for
dual purpose role--both AA [anti-aircraft] and
ground. 115

The bulk of this paragraph describes a fairly credible
defense, reinforced with armor and focused on key terrain to
British Airborne Corps Headquarters, "Airborne Troops Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation
MARKET)" (13September1944), p. 1.
115
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halt Allied armored attack.

However, in closing, it

discredits the analysis by describing the troops as "not
numerous" and of "low category."

It is contradictory.

If

they were judged as ''fighting well," how is it they were
labeled as "low category?"
General Brian Horrocks, XXX Corps Conunander, was unaware
that the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were at Arnhem and
implicated Montgomery and Browning because they did know. 116
Regardless, he showed an appreciation for the difficulty of
his task, based on intelligence analysis:
It was obvious that the day of easy victory were
over.
What had been almost a military vacuum for
48 hours previously was now rapidly filling up with
paratroopers from all over Germany.
Al though many
of them were young and inexperienced, they were all
dedicated Nazis and fought better than many of the
regular forces. • • 11 '

At least in retrospect, the information his Corps
Intelligence Officer acquired led him to understand that the
enemy situation was indeed changing.
Examining intelligence dissemination at corps level one
can observe a disparity.

General Browning, had a full

understanding of the situation but chose to ignore it for
reasons previously stated.

Horrocks relates this situation

here:
In the course of the war, I had received many
orders and instructions from Montgomery, but this
was the first time that he, the master of the
tactical battle, completely underestimated the
enemy strength.
I had no idea whatever that the
9th and 10th Panzer Divisions were refitting just
116
117

Horrocks, Corns Commander, p. 93.
Ibid., p. 86.
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north-east of Arnhem, nor had Dempsey so far as I
know, yet both Montgomery and Browning knew that
118
they were there.

It is also noteworthy that Horrocks points out Montgomery's
gross assumptions on enemy capabilities and strengths.

It

reaffirms Montgomery's desire to execute the plan regardless
of intelligence.
At the division level, commanders were much more
interested in hard intelligence.

They actually directed the

intelligence collection and planning process reasonably well.
These commanders were preparing to fight the enemy eye-toeye, so it stands to reason they would be more concerned.
They were interested in ground truth.

Generally,

intelligence analysis at division level for MARKET-GARDEN,
was much more conservative and realistic, based on the
intelligence they had access to.

Ironically, the divisions,

with the least intelligence capability, provided some of the
best analyses of their particular areas of operation.
The 82nd Airborne Division's Order of Battle Summary (11
September 1944) was particularly well done.

Considering this

summary was published the day after planning for MARKETGARDEN began, that analysis is quite accurate and
circumspect.

This brief passage conveys the nature of the

product:
There is no doubt that the enemy has made a
remarkable recovery within the last few days, at
any rate in the 21 Army Group area.
.A captured
document indicates that the degree of control
exercised over the regrouping and collecting of the
apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army were
little short of remarkable.
Furthermore, the
118

Ibid., p. 93.
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fighting capacity of the new Battle groups formed
from the remnants of battered divisions seems
unimpaired.
.There seems little doubt that our
operational area will contain a fair quota of
Germans, and an estimate of a divisional strength
in this area may not be far wide of the mark. 110

In fact the 82nd Airborne Division was close in their
estimate of the enemy strength.

In their area of operations,

the German 406 Division, hastily organized for the defense,
was gathering cadre and recruits from training units, and
troops from replacement and Luftwaffe battalions. 120
Careful examination of this summary reveals another
striking surprise.

A passage in the Enemy Situation

paragraph reports a unit which they failed to identify, but
most likely refers to the 9th SS Panzer Division.

This is

extremely interesting because SHAEF did not officially
acknowledge the presence of this unit until 16 September in
their Weekly Intelligence Summary.

The division's summary is

hauntingly familiar: Uit is reported that one of the broken
Panzer divisions has been sent back to the area north of
ARNHEIM to rest and refit; this might produce some 50
tanks." 121

In fact, the 9th SS Panzer Division was close to

this total. 122
It is conjecture to guess from which source the 82nd
derived this information on the Panzer
HUMINT, or !MINT.

division~

SIGINT,

They received a Dutch Liaison Officer on

82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET)" (11 September 1944), p. 1.
12° Kershaw, It Never Snows. pp. 119-124.
121 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, "Annex 1C (Intelligence: Order of Battle Summary) to
Field Order No. 11 (Operation MARKET)" (11 September 1944), p.1.
122 Kershaw, It Never Snows, p. 327.
119
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11 September, who also could have provided this information
through Dutch sources. 123 The importance here is that the
division commander placed enough interest and credibility in
the possibility of armored units in their area of operations
to publish it in the analysis.

This is much more timely and

circumspect than their fellows at higher headquarters and
could point to the lack of interference in the dissemination
process.

The American divisions received information from

the British as well as their own permanent headquarters the
XVIII Airborne Corps.
II SS Panzer Corps disposition never made it down to the
1st Airborne Division.
he would face.

The commander simply didn't know what

On the part of General Browning, it was a

conscious decision not to disseminate the intelligence.
Rather than specifically preparing his commanders for a worst
case scenario, Browning, like Montgomery, chose to assume
away enemy capabilities and hope for the best.

As an

airborne commander, he was well aware that lightly armed
paratroopers were no match for any more than a few tanks.

In

his Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation MARKET), he
identified the total armored strength in 21st Army Group Area
of operation as 50-100 tanks. 124

This disclosure was not

specific enough and consequently had little impact.

General

Browning should have indicated that two seasoned, but understrength, SS Panzer Divisions were situated near Arnhem--the
final objective.
123 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, Message to Commander, XVIII Corps (Airborne),
Subject: "Lessons of Operation MARKET -GARDEN" (3 December 1944), p. 1.
124 British Airborne Corps Headquarters, ·Airborne Troops Operation Instruction No. 1 (Operation
MARKET)" (13 September 1944), p.1.
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The commander of the 1st Airborne Division, General
Urquhart, voiced his displeasure at the dissemination process
at the battle:
The planning of the operation was not helped by the
scanty intelligence that was coming our way.
I
knew extremely little of what was going on in and
around Arnhem and my intelligence staff were
scratching around for morsels of information.
I
knew that what information we had received from
across the Channel was bound to be out of date:
it
had filtered through various offices in the 2d Army
and our own corps before reaching us.
!n the
division there was a certain reserve about the
optimistic reports coming through from the 21st
Army Group concerning the opposition we were likely
to meet.
Obviously we would have liked a more
recent picture, but we were subordinate to corps in
such matters.
Browning himself told me that we
were not likely to encounter anything more than a
German Brigade sized group supported by a few
tanks.
.During the week an intelligence officer
at SHAEF.
.came to the conclusion that these
panzer formations were the 9th and possibly the
10th SS Panzer Divisions.
The SHAEF officer's
opinion was not shared by others and, even as our
preparations
continued,
21st
Army
Group
Intelligence were making it plain that they didn't
see eye to eye with SHAEF over the panzer
divisions.
Nothing was being allowed to mar the
optimism prevailing across the Channel . 125

The key commanders, driven by optimism, personal goals
and limited planning time chose to not only ignore the
disposition of the II SS Panzer Corps, but to actively impede
the dissemination to their subordinate commands.

This is

patently obvious in 21st Army Group and 1st British Airborne
Corps.
125

The end results were that the division commanders,

R. Urquhart, Arnhem, pp. 8-9.
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particularly 1st Airborne Division, were deprived of
extremely vital planning intelligence. 126

CHAPTER V

CORCLUSIOR ARD FINAL ANALYSIS

Fate of the 1st Airborne Division

Designed to last just 24-48 hours in length, MARKETGARDEN developed difficulties from the start.

The ground

forces of XXX Corps encountered tough resistance from
remnants of the Fifteenth Army and the newly arriving
parachute regiments.

The Guards Armour Division, restricted

by terrain, suffered severe causalities from German anti-tank
fire.

By nightfall they had managed to advance only six

miles instead of the planned upon thirty-four.
The paratroopers in Arnhem did not fair much better;
leaving the 1st Airlanding Brigade to secure the landing
zones for the next days drop, the 1st Para Brigade set out to
secure the bridges.

Immediately they encountered an SS

Training Battalion that formed a blocking line and delayed
their approach.

One Battalion, under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel John Frost arrived at the bridge where he
established defensive position on the northern approach,
It is necessary to point out that at least one historian after examining much the same materials
as presented in this study excludes Browning from any wrong doing. Geoffrey Powell states,
"Browning was in no way the man to endanger his troops by suppressing information that he
believed to be true... Like any other professional soldier, he was itching to lead into action the
troops he had been training for so many years... But despite these pressures, there can be no
grounds for any suggestion that he deliberately hid information, either from General Urquhart or
from anyone else. His conduct at the time of 'Linnet 2' is sufficient mark of his integrity. Nor would
he have been justified in proposing that the 'Market' operation should be canceled on the
information he had received - and that from an officer in whose judgment he had lost confidence.
To have made such a stand would, in any case, have been a pointless gesture from his point of
view. This time his resignation would have been accepted, and there were plenty of experience
airborne commanders waiting in the wings to replace him, Ridgway among them. n Powell, Devil's
Birthday, pp, 46-47.
12"
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while German forces controlled the southern approach.

The

remainder of the brigade was forced to form a perimeter near
the town of Oosterbeek.
General Model, who watched the airborne drop from his
headquarters in Oosterbeek, traveled to II SS Panzer Corps
headquarters where General Bittrich was preparing his units
for battle.

Dividing his two divisions he formed Kampfgruppe

Harzer (9th SS) and Kampfgruppe Harmel (10th SS), with orders
to secure the Arnhem and Nijmegan bridges respectively and to
destroy the Allied forces.
The situation continued to worsen for the 1st Airborne
Division.

Separated with only one battalion at the bridge,

the remainder of the division repeatedly attempted to fight
through to the bridge.

Encountering strong resistance from

the panzer troops they were forced to the perimeter formed
around divisional headquarters at the Hartenstein Hotel in
Oosterbeek.

The failures and misfortunes for the

paratroopers were many.

In the early stages of the battle

General Urquhart was forced to seek refuge in an attic to
prevent capture and was absent during a crucial thirty-six
hours of the battle.

Weather in England delayed the arrival

of the remainder of the division and the Polish Brigade.
Most importantly the ground forces were delayed by heavy
fighting along the single road approaching Arnhem.

Unable to

communicate and running low on supplies the division was
being destroyed.

Frost's battalion at the bridge battled

tanks and mechanized forces until overpowered on the 21st.
On 26 September, having still not been relieved by
ground forces, the remnants of the 1st Airborne Division
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withdrew across the Lower Rhine river leaving 7,077 of their
their fellows behind as either killed, wounded, or captured.
Final Analysis and Future Applicat.ion

An important lesson can be learned by examining MARKETGARDEN; optimism combined personal goals and ambitions can
destroy the normal military planning process.

Commanders

must control their command environments to ensure that it is
conducive to proper planning based upon potential threats.
This case study is clearly applicable to the United
States military of today.

Current confusion and shifting

roles between conventional warfare and Military Operations
Other Than War (MOOTW) make decision making and planning
extremely dynamic.

The transition to high-technology tools

and high-tempo operations further complicate the issue.

In

short, the restrictive planning conditions in future military
operations will mirror those restrictions and rapid tempo
that the 21st Army Group encountered in September 1944.
Part of 21st Army Group's difficulty in planning was the
tempo of operations.

From Normandy to Arnhem, the First

Allied Airborne Army planned some 15 missions before
executing MARKET-GARDEN and they had seven planning days
before launching the mission.

Such contingency planning is

prevalent in today's MOOTW conditions.

From Somalia, to

Haiti and former Yugoslavia, military operational tempo is
swift.

Many contingencies occur in remote regions which have

little or low intelligence priority.

Under these conditions,

commanders and intelligence officers must work the system so
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that intelligence never again becomes irrelevant to
operational planning.
Montgomery would claim that Operation MARKET-GARDEN was
ninety percent successful.
to see this is not the case.

One only has to look at the gains
The great gamble had failed.

Allied lines were now stretched northwards and dangerously
thin.

Germans forces continued to reinforce and the battle

lines which turned into a stalemate until December 1944 when
the German launched their counter-attack through the Ardennes
forest.
The debate over "broad" versus "narrow" front strategy
would reach a climax during the Battle of the Bulge.
American forces reeled under the 6th Panzer Army which split
the 12th Army Group in two.

Montgomery was given operational

control of Bradley's northern most army.

Capitalizing upon

the shock, confusion and despair of the American forces,
Montgomery launched a campaign to be reinstated as the
overall ground forces commander, pointing to the successful
German offensive as the primary reason.

Criticism at this

crucial time and Montgomery's failure to conduct flanking
attacks against the German offensive, created a
irreconcilable rift between himself and American commanders.
It must be mentioned that despite its extremely poor
execution, the narrow-front strategy itself had some merit.
A single-thrust of forty divisions, as called for by
Montgomery, may well have, in September 1944, been an
undefeatable force.

Conceivably this force could have

occupied the Ruhr and pushed forward towards the German
capital.

However, this concept would have three fatal flaws.
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Logistically the Allies could not sustain such large scale
offensives with a force of this scope.

Secondly, several

divisions, perhaps as high as twenty-five would have to be
dropped off to deal with surrounded or by-passed enemy
pockets of resistance.

Thirdly, political realities

prevented the numerically superior

u. S. forces from serving

under British command, especially the much criticized
Montgomery.

With hindsight, the narrow front approach often

seems appealing, however, when examined under the constraints
of 1944 it is proven to be hopelessly unrealistic.

MARKET-

GARDEN marked the high point of airborne warfare, since, no
element larger than a division has been deployed by a nation
using the vertical envelopment strategy.
It would not be proper to attempt to fix all the blame
for MARKET-GARDEN'S failure on the operational commanders.
Eisenhower, as strategic commander, must share some blame for
his consent to execute an operation which he believed to be
little more than an limited offensive.

However, those that

advocate that Eisenhower should have intervened and stopped
the operation are guilty of a gross oversimplification.

The

chain of command is a fixed and rigid structure that relies
upon commanders at all levels to utilize their judgment and
experience when making decisions.

If the Supreme Commander

would have extended his personal control on forces down three
level of the chain of command, the political ramification
would have been immediate and devastating to the Allied
military alliance.
MARKET-GARDEN unlike many unsuccessful battles has
remained relatively void of scrutiny for over the past fifty
71

years and has not prompted the kind of controversy
surrounding other command decisions.

In the official U.

s.

Army History of World War Two, Charles MacDonald points out,
"perhaps the reason for the lack of acrimony can be found in
the narrow margin by which MARKET-GARDEN failed.

Or, perhaps

more to the point, in the license afforded commanders under
conditions of success such as existed in September 1944 • 127
Military professionals understand the burden of command.
Leaders accept full responsibility for all that happens or
fails to happen on their watch; this is for a good reason.
The power of personality in war, and the climate the
commander fosters have profound influences on all aspects of
operations, including intelligence.

The command climate

General Montgomery set, in planning MARKET-GARDEN, actively
impeded the intelligence and planning process.
The environment, and objectives (personal and
operational) affected Montgomery to such an extent that
intelligence became irrelevant to him.

Had he enjoyed

"perfect intelligence", it is unlikely he would have altered
his plan.

121 Kent A. Greenfield, gen. ed. United States Army in World war II (Washington, DC:
GPO., 1959), The European Theater of Ooerations: Command Decisions, by Charles MacDonald,
p. 442.
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